Each Member State shall assess whether each designated ECI located on its territory possesses a Security Liaison Officer or equivalent. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. The Member State on whose territory a designated ECI is located shall inform the Commission on an annual basis of the number of designated ECIs per sector and of the number of Member States dependent on each designated ECI. State critical infrastructure protection should address cyber threats States have cybersecurity programs focused on citizen data protection and often separately run programs to protect critical infrastructure. Purpose This Directive sets forth the policy and procedures for submission, validation, dissemination, safeguarding, and handling of Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII), voluntarily Target: Critical Infrastructure Critical infrastructure entities encompass the 16 sectors defined by Presidential Policy Directive 21 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience), including the U.S. electric grid, telecommunications networks, financial institutions, manufacturing facilities, transportation facilities, and hospitals. HSPD-7 replaces the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) that omitted agriculture and food. A potential ECI which does not satisfy the requirements of one of the following sequential steps is considered to be ‘non-ECI’ and is excluded from the procedure. 03-02-2021. Priority shall be given to the ICT sector. Article 3 requires each Member State to identify the critical infrastructures which may be designated as an ECI. graduated security measures, which can be activated according to varying risk and threat levels. In this section, the term “critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. The Commission may assist Member States at their request to identify potential ECIs. Certain critical infrastructure industries have a special responsibility in these times to continue operations. Where such a Security Liaison Officer does not exist, each Member State should take the necessary steps to make sure that appropriate measures are put in place. 3. Each Member State shall apply the sectoral criteria in order to make a first selection of critical infrastructures within a sector. Each Member State shall inform the Commission on an annual basis of the number of infrastructures per sector for which discussions were held concerning the cross-cutting criteria thresholds. Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1). Article 2 Definitions For the purpose of this Directive: (a) ‘critical infrastructure’ means an asset, system or part thereof 1. Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank (2). The Commission may participate in these discussions but shall not have access to detailed information which would allow for the unequivocal identification of a particular infrastructure. This Article shall also apply to non-written information exchanged during meetings at which sensitive subjects are discussed. As such, this Directive concentrates on the energy and transport sectors and should be reviewed with a view to assessing its impact and the need to include other sectors within its scope, inter alia, the information and communication technology (‘ICT’) sector. Pursuant to the procedure provided in Annex III, each Member State shall identify potential ECIs which both satisfy the cross-cutting and sectoral criteria and meet the definitions set out in Article 2(a) and (b). 1 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 3020.40 August 19, 2005 ASD(HD) SUBJECT: Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) References: (a) DoD Directive 5160.54, "Critical Asset Assurance Program," January 20, 1998 2. In April 2007 the Council adopted conclusions on the EPCIP in which it reiterated that it was the ultimate responsibility of the Member States to manage arrangements for the protection of critical infrastructures within their national borders while welcoming the efforts of the Commission to develop a European procedure for the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures (‘ECIs’) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Under this approach, man-made, technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given priority. Regional critical infrastructure protection programmes European Union. When they are adopted by Member States, these measures shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. 2. Classified information should be protected in accordance with relevant Community and Member State legislation. Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce 8 National Strategy for Homeland Security , p. 33, “The plan will describe how to use all available policy instruments to 1 Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 3020.40 August 19, 2005 ASD(HD) SUBJECT: Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) References: (a) DoD Directive 5160.54, "Critical Asset Assurance Program," January 20, 1998 There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. 1. In terms of the energy sector and in particular the methods of electricity generation and transmission (in respect of supply of electricity), it is understood that where deemed appropriate, electricity generation may include electricity transmission parts of nuclear power plants, but exclude the specifically nuclear elements covered by relevant nuclear legislation including treaties and Community law. 2. Having regard to the proposal from the Commission. The NIS Directive is intended to assist operators of critical infrastructure in creating cybersecurity programs that can appropriately prevent, detect, notify authorities of and respond to security incidents. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof and communicate the text of those measures and their correlation with this Directive. 2. The primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting ECIs falls on the Member States and the owners/operators of such infrastructures. The Commission should receive generic information from the Member States concerning risks, threats and vulnerabilities in sectors where ECIs were identified, including where relevant information on possible improvements in the ECIs and cross-sector dependencies, which could be the basis for the development of specific proposals by the Commission on improving the protection of ECIs, where necessary. Member States, the Commission and relevant supervisory bodies shall ensure that sensitive European critical infrastructure protection-related information submitted to the Member States or to the Commission is not used for any purpose other than the protection of critical infrastructures. PPD 21 "advances a national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure." European critical infrastructure protection contact points. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure; ‘risk analysis’ means consideration of relevant threat scenarios, in order to assess the vulnerability and the potential impact of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure; ‘sensitive critical infrastructure protection related information’ means facts about a critical infrastructure, which if disclosed could be used to plan and act with a view to causing disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure installations; ‘protection’ means all activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, continuity and integrity of critical infrastructures in order to deter, mitigate and neutralise a threat, risk or vulnerability; ‘owners/operators of ECIs’ means those entities responsible for investments in, and/or day-to-day operation of, a particular asset, system or part thereof designated as an ECI under this Directive. The need to increase the critical infrastructure protection capability in Europe and to help reduce vulnerabilities concerning critical infrastructures was acknowledged. Identifies DOE as the SSA responsible for the energy sector in this directive. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (February 2013), establishes national policy on critical infrastructure security and resilience advancing a national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. recovery, business continuity and crisis management, thus ensuring a more reliable provision of essential services. Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with this Directive by 12 January 2011. 6. In 2004, the Commission issued a Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism. 1. A potential ECI which does satisfy the definition will follow the next step of the procedure. Comprehensive resilience regulation is essential to safeguard all critical infrastructures in Europe. The criteria shall be classified. Without reliable supplies of energy or predictable transportation, our current way of life would not be possible. Security Liaison Officers should be identified for all designated ECIs in order to facilitate cooperation and communication with relevant national critical infrastructure protection authorities. 5. 4. Updates, renames, and reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3020.40 (Reference (a)) to assign responsibilities for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). 1. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the execution of roles assigned to the Department of Defense pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and DoDD Each Member State shall implement an appropriate communication mechanism between the relevant Member State authority and the Security Liaison Officer or equivalent with the objective of exchanging relevant information concerning identified risks and threats in relation to the ECI concerned. In addition, the se identified sectors and work ers are not intended to be the authoritative or exhaustive The operator security plan (‘OSP’) procedure shall identify the critical infrastructure assets of the ECI and which security solutions exist or are being implemented for their protection. upon critical infrastructure to function properly.2 The directive provided an austere definition of critical infrastructure as “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government.”3 PDD-63 set ambitious national goals for the elimination of any significant national vulnerability It is up to each Member State to decide on the most appropriate form of action with regard to the designation of Security Liaison Officers. The cross-cutting criteria thresholds shall be based on the severity of the impact of the disruption or destruction of a particular infrastructure. Measures, principles, guidelines, including Community measures as well as bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation schemes that provide for a plan similar or equivalent to an OSP or provide for a Security Liaison Officer or equivalent, should be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this Directive in relation to the OSP or the Security Liaison Officer respectively. This Directive is addressed to the Member States. “ The use of such guidelines shall be optional for the Member States. 3. Each Member State shall conduct a threat assessment in relation to ECI subsectors within one year following the designation of critical infrastructure on its territory as an ECI within those subsectors. This Executive Order is a down payment on strengthening our critical infrastructure, but the nation still requires cybersecurity legislation in order to update the government’s authorities to address this urgent threat. Given the very significant private sector involvement in overseeing and managing risks, business continuity planning and post-disaster recovery, a Community approach needs to encourage full private sector involvement. The acceptance of the Member State on whose territory the infrastructure to be designated as an ECI is located, shall be required. The identification by the Member States of critical infrastructures which may be designated as ECIs is undertaken pursuant to Article 3. Information pertaining to the designation of a particular infrastructure as an ECI should be classified at an appropriate level in accordance with existing Community and Member State legislation. CISA made a technical update to the document on March 23, 2020 to clarify the description of a small number of essential services and functions in the list. In order to develop European critical infrastructure protection activities in areas which require a degree of confidentiality, it is appropriate to ensure a coherent and secure information exchange in the framework of this Directive. (1)  Opinion of 10 July 2007 (not yet published in the Official Journal). A potential ECI which has passed through this procedure shall only be communicated to the Member States which may be significantly affected by the potential ECI. Council Directive 2008/114/EC is part of the EU framework for critical infrastructure protection. degree in Theoretical physics, with a thesis in Quantum mechanics.
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